This paper explores the effect of moral hazard on both risk-taking and informal risk-sharing incentives. Two agents invest in their own project, each choosing a level of risk and effort, and share risk through transfers. This can correspond to farmers in developing countries, who share risk and decide individually upon the adoption of a risky technology. The paper mainly shows that the impact of moral hazard on risk crucially depends on the observability of investment risk, whereas the impact on transfers is much more utility-dependent.
Introduction
In many circumstances, economic theory hardly explains heterogeneous risk taking behaviors. For instance, in rural economies, the adoption of innovations by farmers, like fertilizers or new crops, varies widely across regions. While heterogeneity of individual characteristics partly explains differences in risk taking behaviors 1 , interaction between agents may also play a role. Here, we consider interactions emerging from risk sharing arrangement. Indeed, many studies document that households share risk through informal insurance. 2 Risk sharing may contribute to shape risk taking in two respects. First, there are some clear-cut stylized facts attesting that farmers are risk-averse, and therefore that they should take more risk when they are insured. Second, a more subtle argument is that risk sharing can embody a moral hazard issue 3 , which may affect individual risk taking decisions.
This paper explores the effect of moral hazard in effort on both risk taking and informal risk sharing incentives. We consider two risk-averse agents. Each agent manages a project. She can affect the return of her project by choosing the technology risk and by exerting an unobservable and costly effort to increase the probability of success of her project. Moreover, agents interact for risk sharing purposes, by setting up a risk sharing contract. In the absence of efficient peer monitoring, sharing revenues may generate a moral hazard problem, that is, they may have no incentives to exert effort.
When investment risk is exogenous, a traditional mechanism design fostering incentives to exert effort reduces transfers, leaving agents' revenues more exposed to their own effort. However, when risk taking is endogenous, the level of risk itself may be used to restore incentives to exert effort. Direct intuition suggests that, if this is the only lever used, the mechanism designer needs to increase risk in order to increase the agent's exposure to her revenue. However, such an increase in risk generates an increased need for transfers, while reducing transfers mechanically reduces incentives to take risk.
Therefore, the joint use of transfers and risk taking as incentive tools induces a priori ambiguous predictions on risk taking and transfers.
The main finding of the paper is that the impact of moral hazard on risk depends on the observability of risk. First, when risk taking is observable, we prove that moral hazard induces an increase in risk taking compared to the case of observable effort, for any strictly increasing and concave utility function; in other terms, with regard to the first-best investment, we obtain over-investment in the risky technology. Regarding risk sharing arrangement, whether transfers increase or decrease compared to the first-best is utility-dependent. Indeed, increased risk taking creates increased needs for transfers 1 See for instance Suri [2011] .
2 See Townsend (1994), Cox and Fafchamps (2008) , Fafchamps and Lund (2003) , Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) , or Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) . 3 For empirical evidence on moral hazard, see for instance Lafontaine (1992) ; for applications related to agricultural context, see Viswanath (2000) for agricultural contract law in Roman Palestine, or Simtowe et al. (2006) in the context of Micro-finance programs in Malawy.
(compared to the first-best). Thus, two conflicting forces shape the impact of moral hazard on transfers when there is endogenous risk taking. On the one hand, for a given level of risk, to solve the moral hazard issue, agents need to reduce transfers. On the other hand, the increase in risk taking creates an increased need for risk sharing. Actually, the presence of moral hazard can either decrease or increase absolute transfer. We present a simple sufficient condition under which transfers are decreased. The condition states that the ratio of the third derivative of utility over the first derivative is decreasing.
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This condition is met by the standard utility functions lying in the class of the Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) utilities. An interesting case is that of Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) preferences, for which the level of wealth transferred between agents is not affected by the presence of moral hazard. This means that risk taking is, in the CARA case, the sole tool used to solve the moral hazard problem.
Second, when private investment is hidden, moral hazard concerns not only effort but also risk taking itself, meaning that agents can deviate jointly in effort and risk from the first-best contract. We then show that both risk and transfers are in general reduced compared to the first-best contract. In other terms, with regard to the first-best investment, we obtain under-investment in the risky technology.
In this latter context, a third-best contract that avoids individual deviations in joint effort and risk level needs to be designed. If we restrict attention to transfers not exceeding the transfer that would generate equal sharing, which is documented by empirical evidence, we show that the (symmetric)
third-best contract 5 is such that both risk taking and transfers are lower than the first-best ones, meaning that observability of investment decisively shapes the impact of moral hazard on risk taking incentives. However, if we allow transfers to exceed the transfer that generates equal sharing, a new candidate for third-best appears, satisfying the condition that risk taking is larger than the first-best, and the transfer is larger than the level generating equal sharing.
We now briefly discuss the relationship of this paper to the literature. The notion of risk sharing was first developed by Borch, who modelled risk sharing agreements as a two-person cooperative agreement similar to ours. 6 He stated the mutualization principle (Borch [1962] ): under complete information, the optimal agreement makes individual wealth only depend on state of nature insofar as the aggregate wealth in that state is concerned.
It is now widely acknowledged that the presence of moral hazard tends to reduce risk sharing, in the sense that it tends to decrease the amount of transfers among agents. Two papers explore the relationship between mutual insurance and moral hazard in context of development economics.
Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) ask whether, in the presence of insurance markets, supplemental informal insurance within the family improves welfare. They model family insurance as transfers within pairs 4 The coefficient Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) . To our knowledge, our article is the first to concentrate on the decrease of that coefficient. 5 The study under hidden investment risk focuses on symmetric contracts. Moral hazard is also investigated in the principal-agent literature. 7 This literature frequently models a principal who wants to design an incentive-compatible contract. Regarding applications to development economics, the closest literature is perhaps sharecropping (see Cheung [1969] and Stiglitz [1974] ), which stresses that moral hazard may explain the existence of such contracts (Reid [1976] , Eswaran and Kotwal [1985] , Ghatak and Pandey [2000] ). In this case, the tenant exerts some hidden effort, and thus sharecropping has good incentive properties from the viewpoint of the owner, even though such contract makes the owner bear part of the risk. In particular, the literature on double-sided moral hazard (Reid [1977] , Eswaran and Kotwal [1985] ) reconciles the theory with some stylized facts about the nature of sharecropping contracts. In contrast with this principal-agent literature, we focus here on the incentive-compatible agreement that can emerge between two risk-averse agents (that is, we have an agent-agent model). Importantly, the principal-agent approach encompasses delegated portfolio management issues (see for example Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer [1985] ), thus differing from the conventional approach insofar as the agent chooses both a risk taking decision and an effort. However, in this branch of the literature, the effort exerted by the agent reveals information about the return on assets. 8 Here, we focus on efforts enhancing the probability that the risky assets will perform well.
The principal-agent literature also addresses group incentives. Analyzing moral hazard in teams or clubs, Holmstrom (1982) and Prescott and Townsend (2006) model situations where agents work on a project whose outcome depends on joint efforts. Used to analyze how firms emerge and operate, these models differ from ours in that the efforts of all agents determine the distribution of the aggregate outcome that has to be split among them. In contrast, in our model the effort of each agent determines the distribution of its own outcome, from which she can transfer wealth to others.
Of course, beyond moral hazard, other factors may reduce risk sharing between households. For instance, and relevant in the context of development economies, the lack of enforceability of contracts may reduce the volume of risk-sharing agreements (Townsend [1994] Our work is also related to the literature on the standard portfolio problem. In this widelyused model, a single agent allocates wealth between a risk-free project and a risky one. Our main contribution to this literature is the modeling of moral hazard and risk sharing in the standard portfolio problem. We allow agents to enhance the probability of success of the risky project. Our paper is therefore related to Fishburn and Porter (1976) or Hadar and Seo (1990) , who study the effect of a shift of distribution of return on attractiveness of investment.
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the the benchmark model in which both efforts and risks are observable. In section 3, we characterize the optimal incentivecompatible sharing rule and the optimal level of risk taking when effort is hidden. Section 4 examines the case in which investment risk is hidden. Section 6 concludes. The programs of the first-best and second-best contracts are presented in respectively Appendices I and II. 
Risk taking in autarky
An agent i, endowed with initial wealth ω i , can invest a share α i ∈ [0, 1] of her wealth in a risky project. We interpret α i as the level of risk taken by agent i. The remaining part is invested in a risk-free project with gross return normalized to 1. The risky project gives a return µ > 1 with probability p (in the case of success) and 0 otherwise.
Agent i can exert a costly effort, which increases the probability of success of her risky project. For instance, a farmer can spend time and money improving skills. When agent i exerts effort e i , the probability of success p i = p(e i ). For simplicity, we consider only two effort levels, e and e, with e < e, respectively leading to probabilities of success p and p such that p − p > 0. The risky project being profitable for every effort level, we assume that the expected gross return on investment is higher than unity under low effort, that is, pµ > 1. Low effort is costless, while the cost for providing high effort, C, is positive. To simplify the setting, we rely on a non monetary separable cost of effort unaffected by wealth. Moreover, the cost of effort is independent of the level of risk taking. This fits well, for instance, with the case of informational cost. Farmers' effort to improve skills may not specifically apply to the proportion of the land on which they intend to plant a new crop variety.
Agents are characterized by a von Neumann-Morgenstern Individual utility u(.), which is assumed to be continuous, with continuous derivative, strictly increasing and concave in wealth. We will assume throughout the paper that an isolated agent is interested in exerting the high level of effort. Hence, in the absence of risk sharing, a single agent i exerts high effort and selects a risk level α i to maximize her expected utility (denoted EU i ). 11 The isolated agent i's program is therefore written:
The solution 12 is given by a risk taking level α i 0 such that:
The LHS of equation (2) is increasing in α 0 for all µ > 1, and it is equal to 1 when α 0 = 0. The condition pµ > 1 implies (1) is unique.
Risk sharing under observable efforts and observable risks 11 That is, we suppose that max
. 12 We do not consider the corner solution α i 0 = 1, which obtains when
. Inada conditions, which impose u (0) = +∞, are sufficient to avoid such a corner solution.
Two individuals, say agent a and agent b, each having a specific project, face the basic investment problem exposed above, and can share risk through monetary transfers. We suppose that agents have the same utility function. We let ω a , ω b denote the initial wealths of respectively agent a, b. We let the real number τ j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, denote the transfer from agent a to agent b in state of nature j (τ j < 0 means that agent b transfers revenues to agent a). Since there is one transfer per state of nature, transfers are not constrained by a specific contractual form (like cross-shareholding, wages or fixed rent for example).
We model a benevolent principal that uses an ex-ante utilitarian criterion and puts the same weight on the two agents. 15 When ω a = ω b , the solution can also be interpreted as the outcome of a Nash bargaining solution with equal outside option and equal bargaining power.
The benevolent principal wants to find a profile of risk levels and transfers (α a * , α b * , τ * 14 In practise, there may be some correlations if farmers belong to the same village.
15 Assuming that the principal puts different weights on the two agents entails major technical difficulties.
To make the moral hazard problem interesting, we assume that the cost of effort is low enough so that the solution of the problem when both agents exert high effort yields larger expected utility than when both agents exert low effort. Thus, the contract (
is the first-best contract.
We present the case where agents have the same initial wealth, i.e. ω a = ω b = ω; at the end of section 3, we show that the case of heterogenous initial wealths boils down to our benchmark case with an appropriate change of variable. Since agents have the same utility function, it is easily shown that the second-best is symmetric, i.e.
). For pedagogical purpose, it is convenient to explain the results graphically under symmetric risk levels and transfers. We let α denote a symmetric risk level (i.e., α = α a = α b ), and τ a transfer in state of nature 2 (thus τ 3 = −τ ), and we let EU (α, τ, e, e) denote the (symmetric) individual expected utility. 16 The first-best contract satisfies the following first-order conditions:
In the plan (α, τ ), the first-order conditions of the system without moral hazard are represented by ww (α), where α ww (τ ) = Argmax α EU (α, τ, e, e) (with subscript 'w' for work). We note that the expected utility is increasing along both curves in the plan (α, τ ) for any α < α * . 17 Their sole intersection corresponds to the first-best contract M * = (α * , τ * ) (see figure 1 below). We thus obtain:
Preliminary result 1 The first-best contract is unique and symmetric in risks and transfers. Moreover, transfers satisfy that agents share their revenue equally in each state of nature, and risk sharing enhances risk taking compared to autarky.
Not surprisingly, agents share wealth equally for risk mutualization purposes, i.e. the exclusive motive for transfers is redistribution 18 , and risk sharing fosters risk taking incentives. 16 That is, EU (α, τ, e, e) = EU a (α, 0, τ, −τ, 0, e, e) = EU b (α, 0, τ, −τ, 0, e, e). For the sake of consistency with the rest of the paper, we maintain the double notation regarding efforts.
17 Indeed, letting EU 1 (resp. EU 2 ) denote the partial derivative of function EU with respect to α (resp. τ ),
. Basically, for any
. For any α < α * , we have
Further, for any α, we have both EU 1 (α, τ ww (α)) = 0 and
18 Hence, the successful agent transfers revenue to the other agent. Cox, Galasso and Jimenez (2006) provide evidence that the average income of donor households exceeds that of recipient households.
Moral hazard under observable investment risk
In this section, we assume that investment risk is observable, but effort level is hidden. The fact that effort is not observable to the contracting partner can be due to the lack of efficient monitoring between farmers, and this creates a potential moral hazard problem. We solve the maximization problem of the benevolent principal, which consists in selecting an incentive-compatible optimum in risk and transfer. To induce effort, the agent needs to be more exposed to her risk, and the standard tool consists in reducing transfers. We argue that an alternative tool may be to increase risk taking.
However, risk taking and risk sharing are strategic complements, in the sense that increased risk sharing enhances risk taking and vice-versa. The impact of moral hazard on risk sharing and risk taking is thus ambiguous: reducing insurance decreases risk taking by complementarity, and therefore reduces the impact of risk taking on incentives to exert effort. Similarly, increasing risk taking calls for insurance, which limits effort incentives. We analyse in this section how agents use these tools jointly to enhance incentives to exert effort.
The game proceeds as follows. First, a contract specifies risk taking behaviors and transfers.
Second, agents take the risk at the level established in the contract and exert an unobservable effort.
Third, nature generates revenues (given the levels of investment and efforts). Last, transfers are enforced on the basis of observable realizations. To make the problem interesting, we assume that the first-best contract is not incentive-compatible, meaning that EU (α * , τ * , e, e) − C < EU (α * , τ * , e, e).
That is, given that investment risk and transfer are observable, defecting upon effort from the firstbest optimum is individually beneficial. All other things being equal, this assumption imposes a lower bound on C.
We turn to the description of the maximization program of the benevolent principal. It can be shown that, with identical initial wealths, the second-best contract contains symmetric risk levels and transfers (see Appendix II), and we let (α * * , τ * * ) represent the second-best optimum (i.e. α a * * =
. Let EU (α, τ, e i , e j ) be the expected utility of agent i when she exerts effort e i and agent j exerts effort e j , under symmetric risk level α and symmetric transfer τ . The second-best contract satisfies 19 :
Remark. In the case of symmetric risk levels and transfers, individual incentives to exert high effort decrease with the effort level of the other agent. Indeed, the incentives to free-ride on effort are higher when the possibility of receiving a transfer is high. As an agent will receive a transfer only if the other agent succeeds, the probability of getting a transfer increases with the effort of the other agent. 19 Of course, the obtained expected utility should be compared to that in which agents exert low effort, choose the optimal risk level and share revenue equally.
Therefore the incentive to shirk is higher when the other agent exerts high effort.
For the sake of clarity, we let EU f (resp. EU s ) represent the agent's expected pay-off in the event of failure (resp. success) of her own project when the other agent exerts effort e:
With these notations, the second-best contract is given by:
The benevolent principal wants to maximize individual overall expected payoffs, maintaining a minimal difference C p−p between expected payoffs in the events of success and of failure (to induce high effort).
Our first observation is that, by concavity of the utility function, the optimal incentive-compatible transfer is basically neither negative, nor in excess of that corresponding to equal sharing. That is,
. Second, to figure out how things work, we depict in the plan (α, τ ) the first-order conditions of the first-best and the second-best contracts as well as the incentive constraint using a specific example (see figure 1) . The function τ IC (α) ('IC' for incentive-constraint) represents the given the assumption that the first-best contract is not incentive-compatible, we have τ IC (α * ) < τ * .
Third, as agents exert high effort under autarky, the risk level α 0 = Argmax α EU (α, 0, e, e), is such
As a preliminary exploration, we carry out the following local analysis. From the first-best contract, let us modify transfer τ , keeping risk constant, in order to restore incentive compatibility. This corresponds to moving from contract M * to contract M = (α * , τ IC (α * )) in figure 1. Restoring incentives to effort basically requires lower insurance, thus τ IC (α * ) < τ * . Now, from contract M , how does expected utility vary locally along the incentive-constraint represented by function τ IC (α)? In particular, does it increase when both transfer and risk increase, or when both decrease? The issue is a priori ambiguous. Indeed, after a simultaneous increase in risk and transfer, both EU f and EU s are affected in opposite directions. Increasing risk level α is detrimental to EU f and beneficial to EU s .
Conversely, increasing transfer τ is detrimental to EU s and beneficial to EU f . We find:
Lemma 1 Consider the contract (α * , τ IC (α * )). For this contract, expected utility increases locally along the incentive constraint. That is,
Focusing on symmetric contracts, lemma 1 implies that the expected utility is locally increasing along the incentive constraint around contract M . The next theorem is much more general. First, it shows that focusing on symmetric contracts can be made without loss of generality, and second it states that the result given in lemma 1 is not only local, but also global (proof in appendix III):
This contract involves an increase in risk taking compared to the first-best contract, i.e.
The message of the theorem is simple. To increase incentives to exert effort, the contract must increase the dependence of after-transfer revenue on effort. Under exogenous risk taking, the appropriate mechanism is to reduce transfers. However, when risk is endogenous, the appropriate mechanism consists in both increasing risk and reducing relative transfers (compared to the transfer inducing equal sharing). That is, moral hazard leads to over-investment in risky technology. This theorem provides therefore an explanation to heterogenous risk taking relying on strategic incentives rather than heterogenous characteristics. In our model, agents bear substantial risk to solve moral hazard, using risk taking and risk sharing as joint tools. Remark. We note that the second-best can be interpreted as a cross-shareholding contract. That is, it can be achieved if each agent holds a share say β in the other's project, with β = τ αµω .
Although the impact of moral hazard on risk taking entails a systematic enhancement for all strictly increasing and concave utilities, there is no clear-cut impact on absolute transfer. Indeed, while reducing transfers contributes to solving moral hazard, increasing risk also entails an increased need for transfers for the sake of mutualization. Technically, as can be seen in figure 1 , if the function τ L (α) is decreasing (resp. increasing) with the level of risk for all α > α * , then τ * * < τ * (resp.
The following proposition gives a condition guaranteeing that the transfer at the secondbest decreases with regard to the first-best (proof in appendix III):
Proposition 1 If the ratio u /u is decreasing, the second-best contract involves a decrease in (absolute) transfers compared to the first-best contract.
The ratio u u can be written as the product P · A, where P = is decreasing in c as soon as γ ≥ −1.
A few related remarks follow. First, the condition given in proposition 1 is necessary for decreasing and convex risk-aversion. Second, if agents are prudent, i.e u > 0, this amounts to having an index of temperance (
−u u
) larger than the index of risk-aversion (temperance is used in Eeckhoudt et al.
[1996] and in Gollier and Pratt [1996] ).
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The case of CARA utilities case is eloquent, since the presence of moral hazard does not affect transfers; i.e. only risk taking is used as an incentive tool. 21 This model echoes the literature on background risks. Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) look at the effect of a zero-mean background risk (that is, a risk uncorrelated with the return of the risky asset) in the basic standard portfolio problem (without risk sharing). Here, risk sharing can be understood as an additional risk, which corresponds to the risk of having to transfer (or receiving) some wealth.
However, this additional risk is clearly negatively correlated with the return on the risky asset: the probability of receiving (resp. making) a transfer is high when the realized return on the risky asset/project is low (resp. high). Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) show that a zero-mean background risk reduces the demand for the risky asset if absolute risk-aversion is decreasing and convex. Moreover, focusing on unfair background risks, Gollier and Pratt (1996) find that "a necessary and sufficient condition for every small unfair background risk to increase the risk premium is that both absolute prudence and absolute temperance be larger than absolute risk-aversion." 
The optimal transfer is thus increasing in level of risk-aversion ρ, probability of success p and return on the risky technology µ (see figure 2 ).
Hence, with CARA utilities, solving moral hazard entails no impact on transfers. Indeed, the increase in risk taking aimed at solving moral hazard modifies wealth. This usually modifies the attitude of agents toward risk, and transfers purge this second-order effect, with the exception of the CARA case, for which absolute risk-aversion is independent of wealth.
As stated earlier, the inequality τ * * < τ * holds in most cases, but τ * * ≥ τ * is also a possible outcome, as illustrated by the following example:
, with k = 0.00005, a = 0.1. In this case u is concave for ω < 8. We then find τ * * > τ * for ω = 5, µ = 2.2, p = 0.455, C p−p = 1.9 (the example satisfies our underlying assumptions, and notably the fact that an isolated agent is interested in exerting high effort).
To sum up, under observable investment risk and hidden effort, risk taking increases compared to the first-best while transfers may either decrease or increase. Transfers decrease for many utilities, and they are unaffected under CARA utility. sharing of wealths). We also note that the agent with higher initial wealth gives more to the other if she succeeds and the other fails than the amount she receives when she fails and the other succeeds
Moral hazard under hidden investment risk
In the preceding section, we found that the presence of moral hazard linked to risk-reducing effort enhances risk taking incentives, irrespective of the shape of utilities. Key to this result is that investment risk is observable, while effort is not. However, in some circumstances, risk taking itself is hidden. For example, distant farmers (e.g., situated in separate villages or regions) may not have detailed knowledge about the production technologies used by others, like their innovation content.
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In this case, geographical distance may explain risk unobservability. Another example may concern fishers grouped into cooperatives: in this latter case, each fisher explores her own fishing area, and the technological production by itself can make risk level hidden. When risk is unobservable, agents may see no advantage in conforming with the risk choice of the benevolent principal. Hence, strategic incentives for agents to deviate from the prescribed level of risk should be incorporated. This section examines risk taking and transfers under moral hazard linked to both risk-reducing efforts and risk taking decisions. 22 An interior solution of the game with heterogeneous initial wealths obtains when the difference of initial wealths is not too large. If the solution is not interior then the poor will invest all her wealth in risky project. 23 A basic incentive to share risks originated from plantations in separate areas is that the likelihood for respective risks to be uncorrelated is higher compared to plantations located in a same area (see
Bramoullé and Kranton [2007]).
The modified game proceeds as follows. First, a contract specifies transfers; second agents exert a hidden risk-reducing effort and select an unobservable risk level; third nature generates revenues; last, transfers are enforced on the basis of observable realizations. We seek for a contract that guarantees high effort (incentive compatibility). In particular, given that risk levels are hidden, under the thirdbest contract agents should gain no advantage from deviating jointly in effort and risk level; that is, the actions of each agent should be a Nash equilibrium (i.e. each agent plays a best-response strategy to the current strategy of the other agent).
We restrict attention to symmetric contracts. Let α sw (τ ) = Argmax α EU (α, τ, e, e) ('s' for shirk). This represents the optimal level of risk chosen by an agent when the transfer is fixed to τ , she shirks and the other works. Let function τ sw (α) ≡ α −1 sw (α). The symmetric optimal contract is then the solution of the program 24 (α * * * , τ * * * ) = Argmax (α,τ ) EU (α, τ, e, e) s.t. EU (α, τ, e, e) − EU (α sw (τ ), τ, e, e) ≥ C
Note that the incentive constraint is more demanding in the program (6) than in the case of observable investment risk program (5) . Indeed, the constraint is equivalent to EU (α, τ, e, e) − C ≥ EU (α i , τ, e, e) for all α i , which includes the incentive constraint of the second-best (α i = α). Further, we note that the second-best contract (α * * , τ * * ) is not an optimum of this program. Intuitively, agents would be likely to reduce their risk taking behavior as they are not well enough insured by the second-best transfer.
To start with, we restrict attention to the case in which transfers do not exceed the transfer corresponding to equal sharing. This means that, ex-post, the successful agent should be richer than the agent that fails, which is strongly supported by empirical evidence. This restriction therefore appears rather weak. We define the function
Hence, given a transfer τ , agents find it profitable to lower both risk taking and effort if and only if H(τ ) < 0. To get the symmetric third-best contract, we need to define the contract (α c , τ c ), with τ c = max τ < τ * s.t. α ww (τ ) = α IC (τ ) and α c = α ww (τ c ). 25 We obtain the following theorem (proof in appendix IV):
Theorem 2 The optimal symmetric contract of the program (6) satisfies (α * * * , τ * * * ) = (α ww (τ * * * ), max{τ < τ c s.
t. H(τ ) = 0})
When transfers do not exceed the transfer corresponding to equal sharing, the symmetric optimal (third-best) contract is such that both risk taking and transfer are lower than in the first-best. 24 As in the preceding section, we assume that the optimal contract obtained when both agents exert low effort generates less utility than the optimum of this program. 25 The transfer τ c exists. The point follows from the observation that τ IC (α 0 ) > 0 and that τ IC (α * ) < τ ww (α * ).
A graphical intuition for why theorem 2 holds is given in the typical case depicted in figure 3 .
First, the contract (α * * * , τ * * * ) satisfies that agents are not interested in modifying their risk level, Figure 3 : The contract (α * * * , τ * * * )
given that both exert high effort, inducing that the contract lies on the curve τ ww (α). Also, the contract must be incentive-compatible. This implies that the transfer does not exceed τ c , otherwise agents would exert low effort. Second, and by construction of the second-best incentive constraint, the contract (α c , τ c ) depicted in the figure satisfies that the expected utility when exerting high effort is equal to that when exerting low effort (given that the other agent exerts high effort). From this observation, we can derive that the agent's expected utility for the contract (α c , τ c ) when both agents exert high effort is lower than the expected utility for the contract (α sw (τ c ), τ c ) when this agent exerts low effort and the other high effort; this implies that the contract (α c , τ c ) is not a Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, we know that an isolated agent is interested in exerting high effort. By continuity, there is at least one risk level τ ∈]0, τ c [ such that the agent is indifferent between exerting high effort for the contract (α ww (τ ), τ ) and low effort for the contract (α sw (τ ), τ ). Since the expected utility is increasing along the function α ww (τ ) for all α < α * , we select the contract with the highest risk level, this being the contract (α * * * , τ * * * ).
Remark. Allowing transfers to exceed the transfer generating equal sharing, a new candidate for third-best contract can emerge (see proof of theorem 2 and figure 5 therein). This new contract satisfies that risk taking exceeds the first-best level, and the transfer exceeds the level of transfer inducing equal sharing, meaning that ex-post the agent that fails is richer than the agent that succeeds. Indeed, for any risk level α larger than the first-best, the contract with a transfer generating equal sharing ( αµω 2 , α) is incentive-compatible (risk taking is high enough to enforce effort). Now, that contract should resist to joint deviation in risk and effort. This requires both a high risk level (to foster effort), and a transfer larger than the level corresponding to equal sharing of revenues (to foster the required risk taking level).
Implications
Our theoretical results have certain implications for the understanding of risk sharing and risk taking behaviors in developing economies. The comparison of Theorems 1 and 2 also offers some implication regarding peer monitoring.
In principle, monitoring both effort and risk would be equivalent to both effort and investment risk being observable. However, when monitoring is costly, should agents monitor effort or investment risk? One striking conclusion of the model is that it is never optimal to monitor both effort and risk. When the cost of effort monitoring is lower than the gap between first-best and second-best, the optimal monitoring strategy consists in monitoring only effort, and this induces the first-best level of risk taking (even when it is not observable). Indeed, the first-best level of risk taking maximizes individual utility when both agents exert high effort. Otherwise, in cases where monitoring effort is too costly, it is optimal to monitor investment risk if the gap between the second-best and the third-best is higher than the cost of monitoring risk.
Concluding remarks
We have considered a model in which two agents make risky investments and set up optimal transfers jointly in the presence of moral hazard. We have shown that both risk taking and transfers are in general used as incentive tools. When risk taking is observable, we found that, for all strictly increasing and strictly concave utilities, the presence of moral hazard enhances risk taking incentives.
Regarding transfers, we provided a sufficient condition, involving the third derivative of utility, under which transfers are decreased. While this condition is met by many utility functions, absolute transfer is not always decreased. In particular, for CARA utilities, moral hazard has no impact on transfers; it only increases risk taking. We have also shown that things are different when private investment is hidden. In this case, (symmetric) third-best contracts satisfy that both risk taking and transfers are lower than the first-best if we forbid transfers exceeding the transfer corresponding to equal sharing of revenues). These findings suggest not only that investment risk should be incorporated in risk sharing models, but also that the observability of this risk taking is crucial.
The model can be extended in several directions.
Risk measures and risk taking behaviors. This work offers some perspectives for empirical research. The primitives of our model are (i) the accurateness of moral hazard issue on effort, (ii) the propensity of households to use informal insurance to bear risk (rather than credit, savings or extra job opportunities), (iii) the perfectness of commitments, (iv) the status of investment risk observability of risk sharing partners. To delineate the exact contours of risk sharing and risk taking behaviors, all of these primitives have to be simultaneously controlled. In particular, some specificities might result from the urbanization context. First, risk taking may be more observable in close knit villages than in urban areas, where neighbouring relationships are often more anonymous and perhaps less durable. Second, risk sharing might be less effective in urban areas (although present, see Alvi and Dendir [2008] for a recent evidence that risk sharing transfers exist between poor urban households in Ethiopia). 26 Third, and partly due to increased anonymity of neighbouring links in towns, moral hazard issues may be more pronounced in urban areas.
Overall, to raise some reasonable conclusions, it would be useful to develop more empirical research on risk measures and risk taking behaviors. Indeed, while there is now a relatively dense empirical literature in development economics identifying informal risk sharing between households, there is only few attempts to study risk taking (see Fafchamps (2010) for an explanation about the specific difficulties faced by econometricians to measure risk as well as its relationship to risk taking behaviors).
A fortiori, assessing the observability of risk taking may be a difficult task. Of course, at the level of generality of the present model, a risky investment may concern various choices, like education levels, agricultural projects or jobs, and the specific nature of each type of risk, as well as the very context 26 Many reasons can be advocated: opportunities for multiple jobs may reduce the need for interhousehold risk sharing; it may be more easy to differentiate between exogenous risk from risks influenced by behaviors in rural villages; anonymity, which may be more accurate in urban areas, may deter informal risk sharing; urban areas may facilitate the access to formal insurance.
in which agents invest, matters crucially.
Investment risk observability versus income correlations. This paper has pointed out the role of observability of investment risk for understanding behaviors. However, research should be deepened to encompass all consequences for the design of policy interventions. To illustrate the difficulties of finding a relevant policy, a basic tradeoff for the policymaker stems immediately from our study.
Since second-best is more desirable than third-best, one may infer that a relevant policy intervention could consist in promoting the observability of private investments. For instance, a policymaker may sponsor risk sharing arrangements between neighbouring farmers, and the induced relevant policy recommendation may require some geographical proximity between parties. However, "if network members live too close to one another, they will not be able to insure against area-specific shocks, and monitoring costs may be too high to take advantage of spatial risk diversification." (Cox and Jimenez [1998] ). And indeed, ensuring a low level of correlations between risky investments often requires to match farmers across different villages or communities. For a policymaker, this raises a specific tradeoff between the observability of investment risks and the correlation of the returns of the projects. In this regard, one relevant information is the fact that incomes are probably less correlated in towns, suggesting unambiguously that, everything equal, potential dilemmas between observability and correlation are less severe in urban areas than in close knit villages. Adequate policy interventions might then possibly use different tools for villages and urban areas. While promoting observability in urban areas, the policymaker may rather sponsor risk sharing among households with uncorrelated incomes in rural villages.
Endogenous matching. Whereas this paper focused on a benevolent principal view, it would be interesting to study individual incentives to set up contract. This opens the scope for endogenous matching issue. 27 Would symmetric groups be observed at equilibrium, or are heterogeneous pairings sustainable? In our model, at least two mechanisms might generate negative sorting. A first one relies on risk-aversion and insurance motives. Basically, heterogeneous pairings can emerge if the relatively less risk-averse agent insures the more risk-averse agent; in a polar case, a risk neutral agent may prefer to be matched with a risk-averse agent than a risk neutral agent. This might be linked to heterogeneity in wealths. In particular, under DARA utilities, the richer is less risk averse. Another mechanism for negative sorting might obtain if one agent is more able to bargain a share of the surplus than the other (in the spirit of the mechanism described in Gathak and Karavainov [2011] ). For instance, under heterogeneous wealths, the richer might be more able to capture the surplus (because, for example, of better outside options).
Other applications. While the present paper focused on the context of farmers in developing villages, our model is highly stylized and utilities are general. Hence, the basic ingredients of our setting may be found in other economic situations, like over-the-counter (OTC) contracts in financial markets, or the remuneration scheme of portfolio managers in a hedge fund. It would be challenging to explore further such applications.
7 Appendix APPENDIX I. First-Best program.
The following notations are useful: for i ∈ {a, b}, ω
The objective function of the benevolent principal is written:
This generates the six following first order conditions, with respect to respectively τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 , τ 4 , α a , α b :
These two last conditions, related to risk levels, are independent of weights. We find:
Taking the difference between equation (11) and equation (12), it follows that
We have therefore
and
We conclude that ω Last, we observe that α 0 < α * . Indeed, the optimal risk taking is autarky is α 0 such that
. We define function g such that
The equation f (α * ) = 0 can be written as g(α
. By concavity of function u, we have:
With equation (2) in mind, this gives g(α 0 ) <
, that is f (α 0 ) > 0. Therefore, as f is decreasing and f (α * ) = 0, we get α * > α 0 .
APPENDIX II. Second-Best program (observable investment risk).
The Lagrangian with six instruments is:
We obtain the ten conditions:
(
We find:
We also get:
The difference between (18) and (19) is written:
More, we obtain from (21) and (22) that
Given that
we find
Suppose λ 2 < λ 1 without loss of generality. Then, equation (32) 
and thus we obtain a contradiction. If only one is binding, then
which entails a contradiction. Thus, we have λ 2 = λ 1 . This induces ω APPENDIX III. Characterization of the second-best solution (observable investment risk).
The Lagrangian. Given that the second-best is symmetric, we focus on symmetric risk levels 
This gives:
We introduce the following notations for convenience:
D(α,τ ) and IC(α, τ ) = EU s (α, τ, e) − EU f (α, τ, e) − C. The system (40) can be written as
We let functions τ L (α) and τ IC (α) represent the functions describing resp. function V (α, τ ) = 0 and IC(α, τ ) = 0 in the plan (α, τ ). We observe that τ
Function τ L (α) is increasing. The equation V (α, τ ) = 0 takes into account the first derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to τ and α, and writes as
A direct application of the implicit function theorem shows that for any strictly increasing and concave utility, function τ L (α) is increasing.
Binding incentive constraint τ IC (α) is increasing. The incentive constraint defines an implicit relationship between τ and α with:
This ratio is positive. Hence, function τ IC (α) is increasing.
Proof of lemma 1. We prove the following slightly more general statement:
From equation (5) we get EU (α, τ, e, e) = (1 − p)EU f (α, τ, e) + pEU s (α, τ, e). Further, the binding incentive constraint is given by EU s (α, τ, e) − EU f (α, τ, e) = C. The expected utility on the incentive constraint can then be written
Let EU s1 (resp. EU s2 ) denote the partial derivative of function EU s (α, τ, e) with respect to α (resp. τ ). Thus,
Note that EU s1 (α, τ IC (α), e) = ωB(α, τ ) and EU s2 (α, τ IC (α), e) = −D(α, τ ). Given equation (36), we obtain:
The sign of function V (α, τ ) is the same sign as AD − BE, which is the opposite of the sign of
. But function V (α, τ ) is increasing in τ . Then, for any risk level α such that
, we have V (α, τ IC (α)) < 0 and thus dEU (α,τ IC (α),e,e) dα > 0. In particular, we have
Proof of theorem 1.
Step 1: we show that ∀α ≥ 0,
cally, this means that the curve τ L (α) does not cross the area 'in-between' curves τ ES (α)
Step 2: we show that τ L (0) > 0.
Basically, V (0, 0) = 1−pµ p(1−p) . Since 1 < pµ, we get V (0, 0) < 0. As
> 0, we are done.
Step 3: we show that for all α < α
[Graphically, this means that curve
From step 2, we get τ ES (0) < τ L (0). We then deduce from step 1 that for all α < α * , τ ES (α) < τ L (α).
Step 4: we show that α * < α * * .
Recall that (τ * * , α * * ) = Argmax (τ,α) EU (α, τ, e, e) s.t. EU (α, τ, e, e) − EU (α, τ, e, e) ≥ C This contract basically exists, because the region of incentive-compatible contracts is non-empty.
We observe that, since we assume that the first-best contract is not incentive-compatible, we have
Then we consider two cases:
Then curves τ IC (α) and τ L (α) never cross for risk levels lower than the first-best. That is, for all α
. Indeed, we know from step 3 that τ L (α) > τ ES (α). Then the second-best contract satisfies α * < α * * , and we are done.
CASE 2: curves τ IC (α) and τ L (α) cross for some risk level lower than the first-best. That is, there Figure 4 illustrates the case. First, the expected utility at contract M is larger than its value in any point (α, τ ) such that α < α x . Indeed, expected utility basically increases when, fixing α, we go from any feasible transfer to the transfer corresponding to equal sharing; and further, we know from system (4) that the expected utility increases along function τ ES (α) up to the first-best contract M * , in particular it is increasing up to contract M x .
Second, by lemma 1 the expected utility increases along function τ IC (α) from contract M x to contract M . Since the expected utility is increasing locally along function τ IC (α) at contract M , we are done. 
Let h(c) = u (c)u (c + τ ) − u (c)u (c + τ ). Then equation (38) writes:
For every concave utility function, u (ω s − τ ) < u (ω f + τ ). Further, pµ > 1 means
Therefore, a sufficient condition for equation (39) Hence, to obtain ∂V (α,τ ) ∂α > 0 (and therefore τ * * < τ * ), a sufficient condition is that the ratio u u is decreasing.
Proof of example 2. We will show that τ L (α) is flat for CARA utilities. Basically, from equation APPENDIX IV. Characterization of the (symmetric) thirdbest solution (hidden investment risk).
We claim that the third-best contract (τ * * * , α * * * ) exists. Basically, H(τ c ) < 0 and H(0) > 0. By continuity, there exists τ ≤ τ c such that H(τ ) = 0. Two cases can arise:
CASE 1: for all intersections between curves τ IC (α) and τ ww (α), the risk level is lower that the first-best. That is, for all contracts (τ, α ww (τ )) such that τ ww (α) = τ IC (α), we have α ww (τ ) < α * .
Then clearly α * * * < α * . Now, if τ > τ c , the contract (τ, α ww (τ )) is not incentive-compatible because α ww (τ ) < α IC (τ ). If τ ∈]τ * * * , τ c [, agents have incentives to reduce both effort and risk level because H(τ ) < 0. Last, if τ < τ * * * , EU (α ww (τ ), τ, e, e) is increasing in α, which means that the contract (τ, α ww (τ )) is not an optimum. In the end, the third-best-contract is the contract (τ * * * , α * * * ) and we are done.
CASE 2: there exists an intersection of curves τ IC (α) and τ ww (α) such that the risk level is larger that the first-best. That is, there exists a contract (τ, α ww (τ )), with α ww (τ ) > α * , such that τ ww (α) = τ IC (α).
Note that, for all α > α * , the contract (τ, α ww (τ )) satisfies that τ ww (α) > τ ES (α), that is the contracts on curve τ ww (α) contain transfers larger than the transfer corresponding to equal sharing. Figure 5 depicts a typical CASE 2. 29 We now define the transfer τ c = min τ > τ * s.t. α ww (τ ) = α IC (τ ) . Then, using a similar argument to that used to establish that H(τ c ) < 0, we get H(τ c ) < 0, meaning 29 To illustrate, this situation can arise with CARA utility (for instance, set C = 0.0006, ω = 4, µ = 2.5, a = 2, p = 0.9, p = 0.83).
that the contract (τ c , α ww (τ c )) is not robust to individual deviations in joint effort and risk. Consider now the following two contracts (τ R , α R ) and (τ R , α R ) defined as follows: The contract (τ R , α R ), which is the equivalent of the third-best contract in CASE 1, exists. The contract (τ R , α R ) satisfies that τ R > α R µω 2 . This contract may not exist, since it may be that, for all τ ∈ [τ c , ω], H(τ ) < 0. In that latter situation, the third-best contract is determined as in CASE 1, that is, the third-best contract is the contract (τ R , α R ). If, however, the contract (τ R , α R ) exists, the third-best contract is determined as follows.
As with CASE 1, the contract (τ R , α R ) is a candidate. If τ < τ R , EU (α ww (τ ), τ, e, e) is increasing in α, which means that the contract (τ, α ww (τ )) is not an optimum. If τ ∈]τ R , τ c [, agents have incentives to lower both effort and risk level because H(τ ) < 0. If τ ∈ [τ c , τ * ], the contract (τ, α ww (τ )) is not incentive-compatible because α ww (τ ) < α IC (τ ).
The contract (τ R , α R ) is also a candidate. If τ ∈]τ * , τ c ], then α IC (τ ) > α ww (τ ), implying that the contract (τ, α ww (τ )) is not incentive-compatible. If τ ∈]τ c , τ R [, then H(τ ) < 0, and thus agents have incentives to reduce both effort and risk level. Last, if τ > τ R , EU (α ww (τ ), τ, e, e) is decreasing in α, which means that the contract (τ, α ww (τ )) is not an optimum. In the end, (τ * * * , α * * * ) = Argmax (τ R ,α R ),(τ R ,α R ) EU (α, τ, e, e)
Now, if we restrict attention to transfers that do not exceed the transfer corresponding to equal sharing, the contract (τ R , α R ) should not be taken into account, and therefore (τ * * * , α * * * ) = (τ R , α R ).
